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I’m excited to share a preview of my article for the Transportation Law Journal Volume 50.2 that addresses one of the most consequential developments in U.S. trade and transportation policy in recent years. On June 6, 2025, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) proposed a refined set of measures under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to counter China’s coercive maritime industrial strategy.
These measures build on USTR’s earlier April 17, 2025 determination and represent a bold recalibration of U.S. trade enforcement to bolster maritime resilience and national security. My forthcoming article, “Navigating Economic Statecraft at Sea,” analyzes the legal underpinnings, strategic rationales, and national security implications of these Section 301 actions.[1] It contends that the USTR’s evolving approach—though disruptive to some commercial operations—offers a lawful, calibrated, and strategically vital response to China’s state-backed campaign for global dominance in shipbuilding, port ownership, and LNG transport.
In April 2024, the USTR launched a landmark Section 301 investigation into China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors.[2]The action was notable not only for its self-initiation—undertaken without a formal petition—but for its intent: to respond to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) growing leverage over global maritime infrastructure, developed through a state-directed industrial model.[3]
The investigation culminated in the USTR’s April 17, 2025 determination, introducing a suite of non-tariff enforcement measures including escalating port access fees, licensing restrictions on Chinese-affiliated liquefied natural gas (LNG) transport, and reforms to the Maritime Security Program (MSP).[4] These actions aim to safeguard U.S. strategic and commercial interests while deterring coercive Chinese maritime dominance.
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2411) authorizes the USTR to act against foreign practices that burden U.S. commerce—even if they do not violate formal trade agreements.[5]Here, the USTR invoked its “Category 3” authority, arguing that China’s subsidization of shipbuilding, strategic port acquisitions under the Belt and Road Initiative, and consolidation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) burdened U.S. commerce and posed national security risks.[6] While Section 301 usage declined following the rise of WTO dispute mechanisms, the statute was revitalized in the 2017–2018 investigation into Chinese technology transfer practices. The current maritime-focused action builds on that precedent, tailoring enforcement to modern threats.
In U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, the Court of International Trade reaffirmed the broad discretion afforded to the Executive under Section 301, supporting the legal durability of the USTR’s approach.[7]The April 2025 determination imposed new port access fees on vessels built, owned, or operated by Chinese entities, escalating from $50 per net ton to $140/NT by 2028.[8] A secondary tier applied to non-Chinese operators using Chinese-built vessels.[9] The use of net tonnage aligns with the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships (1969), ensuring proportionality and administrative clarity.[10]
At the same time, USTR imposed licensing requirements on U.S.-origin LNG shipped by Chinese-linked carriers, adding limits on transshipment and subjecting related infrastructure to export control reviews.[11] MSP eligibility was narrowed to prioritize high-capacity roll-on/roll-off vessels with no Chinese ownership or financing ties.[12]
Following public comment and interagency review, the USTR issued refined guidance on June 6, 2025.[13] Key modifications included recalibrating port fees to net tonnage and shifting LNG restrictions from blanket prohibitions to a case-by-case licensing model—an approach that preserved enforcement strength while easing allied energy security concerns.[14]
The USTR also clarified how “Chinese control” would be defined for enforcement purposes, distinguishing between majority ownership, operational control, and incidental sourcing.[15]This helps avoid penalizing neutral or allied carriers with marginal PRC input while maintaining pressure on state-backed competitors.
These refinements underscore the administration’s commitment to procedural fairness under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 553) and to building a coalition-oriented enforcement architecture. The goal is to project economic power while preserving legitimacy, legal defensibility, and multilateral cohesion.
For industry, the implications are significant. Shipping firms must reassess fleet composition to avoid port fees. LNG exporters and charterers face additional regulatory burdens, including compliance reviews and logistical rerouting. Financial institutions—especially insurers and lenders—must adapt due diligence procedures to reflect evolving definitions of Chinese ownership and control.
Ultimately, the USTR’s Section 301 strategy reflects a shift from reactive trade policy to anticipatory, risk-based governance. It integrates trade law with national security doctrine, representing a recalibrated model of economic statecraft for an era in which infrastructure is contested terrain.
[1] Jordan J. Foley, Navigating Economic Statecraft at Sea: USTR’s Section 301 Maritime Measures and China’s Industrial Strategy, Transp. L.J. (forthcoming).
[2] Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors, 89 Fed. Reg. 29424 (Apr. 17, 2024).
[4] Notice of Action and Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114 (Apr. 23, 2025) (imposing phased port service fees, LNG export vessel requirements, and exemptions—including for MSP-enrolled vessels).
[5] 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1); Notice of Action 90 Fed. Reg. at 17114 (Apr. 23, 2025).
[6] Initiation of Section 301 Investigation, 89 Fed. Reg. at 29424 (invoking “Category 3” authority for burdensome practices not necessarily inconsistent with international trade agreements, including subsidies, port acquisitions, and SOE consolidation).
[7] U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1034 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1985).
[8] Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. at 17115 (imposing phased port access fees on vessels built, owned, or operated by Chinese entities, escalating from $50 per net ton to $140 per net ton by 2028).
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