D.C. Court: The Jones Act Advances U.S. Shipbuilding, Employment, and National Security Interests

Chandler D. Thornton

The author is a J.D. candidate at Tulane University Law School, where he is pursuing a certificate of concentration in maritime law and is a member of the Tulane Maritime Law Journal. All views expressed are the author’s alone.

I. What is the Jones Act?

 

The Jones Act has been in the news recently. Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly known as the Jones Act, is the primary law governing the U.S. coastwise trade or maritime cabotage.[1] Cabotage laws regulate “the transport of goods or passengers from one port or place to another in the same country.”[2] The law is named after the 1920 Act’s original sponsor, U.S. Senator Wesley L. Jones of Washington State.[3]

 

However, similar laws have existed for centuries. While there is no exact consensus on when cabotage laws originated, some legal scholars point to an English law enacted in 1381 during the reign of Richard II as one of the earliest recorded examples.[4] Today, cabotage laws are far from unique to the U.S., with 105 nations around the world having a form of such laws.[5]

 

Moreover, cabotage laws are also not unique to waterborne transportation. For example, a foreign aircraft cannot transport passengers or goods between U.S. airports, such as from New York (JFK) to Los Angeles (LAX).[6] Similarly, a foreign motor carrier is also generally prohibited from point-to-point transportation within the U.S.[7] In other words, the Jones Act is merely America’s maritime version of a common domestic transportation law among nations worldwide.

 

Under the Jones Act, vessels possessing a validly issued “coastwise endorsement” are eligible to transport merchandise between two U.S. coastwise points.[8] Today, the Jones Act is primarily administered by three federal agencies: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). In practice, these agencies often determine the scope of the Jones Act.[9]

 

A coastwise transportation of merchandise occurs “when merchandise laden at a point embraced within the coastwise laws . . . is unladen at another coastwise point, regardless of the origin or ultimate destination of the merchandise.”[10] Merchandise includes “goods, wares, and chattels of every description . . . [including] merchandise the importation of which is prohibited.”[11]

 

To be eligible for a coastwise endorsement, a vessel must sail under the U.S. flag,[12] be built in the U.S.,[13] and be owned and controlled by U.S. citizens.[14] In general, U.S.-flagged vessels must also meet U.S. crewing requirements. For a vessel to be considered U.S.-crewed, the vessel must satisfy the citizenship standards required of all U.S.-documented vessels.[15]

 

The Jones Act terminology is also used to describe a broader collection of coastwise laws, some of which were enacted before the 1920 Act.[16] In fact, the Jones Act traces its roots to America’s earliest days as a nation. Among the first-ever U.S. laws were those that set rates of customs duties on various goods, imposed tonnage-based fees on ships entering port, established vessel registration requirements, and regulated the mechanics of collecting impost and tonnage fees.[17]

 

In 1789, the third law ever enacted by Congress even stated that “every ship or vessel employed in the transportation of any of the produce or manufactures of the [U.S.], coastwise within the said States, except such ship or vessel be built within the said States, and belong to a citizen or citizens thereof,” was required to “on each entry, pay fifty cents per ton.” Unlike foreign-built and foreign-owned vessels, U.S.-built and U.S.-owned vessels were subject to paying “six cents per ton” at most “once in any year.”[18]

 

While the law has adapted in various ways, such as shifting from a tax on goods transported by foreign vessels to a general ban on coastwise transportation by foreign vessels,[19] the fundamental principles remain the same today.[20]

 

Fast forward to March 17, 2026. The Trump Administration issued a sixty-day waiver of the Jones Act, which is set to expire on May 17, 2026.[21] The decision followed the commencement of Operation Epic Fury, a coordinated military operation aimed at dismantling the Iranian regime’s security apparatus, which resulted in the death of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[22] Among other ancillary effects, Operation Epic Fury led to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz[23] and volatility across global energy markets, a situation that remains ongoing.[24]

 

In light of the March 17 waiver, the Jones Act is now in the spotlight. This presents an opportunity to discuss the legal framework surrounding administrative waivers of the coastwise laws. Still, the March 17 waiver is not the only Jones Act story that made headlines so far this year.

 

On January 20, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia resoundingly dismissed several constitutional challenges made against the Jones Act. In his forty-six-page opinion, Chief Judge James E. Boasberg succinctly stated: “Congress enacted the legislation to advance American shipbuilding, employment, and national security, not to discriminate against particular ports.”[25] This blog post analyzes both of these recent legal developments.

 

II. Administrative Waivers of the Jones Act

While Congress has legislatively exempted certain geographic locations and vessel types from the Jones Act’s requirements, this blog post addresses administrative waivers rather than legislative exemptions.[26] The March 17 waiver originally covered 659 cargo types,[27] which was later expanded to 663 types.[28] According to the White House, the waiver was issued “to mitigate the short-term disruptions to the oil market” and “strengthen our critical supply chains.”[29] The waiver remains in effect at the time of this blog post’s publication.

 

However, since 2021, MARAD has been statutorily required to publish certain information for every voyage of every vessel operating under such a waiver. Within ten days of the conclusion of such a voyage, owners and operators of non-coastwise-qualified vessels must report the following information to MARAD: the vessel’s name and flag, the name of the owner and operator, the voyage dates, the ports of call, a description of the cargo carried, and an explanation of why the waiver was in the interest of national defense. MARAD is then required to publish this information on its website within forty-eight hours of receipt.[30]

 

As of the date of this blog post, MARAD has published the statutorily required information for five vessels that have completed coastwise voyages under the March 17 waiver. This includes the Liberian-flagged bulk carrier JPS Elli, the Danish-flagged tanker Torm Agnete, the Singaporean-flagged LPG tanker Chrysopigi Lady, the UK-flagged tanker Stena Imperator, and the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker Cabo Deseado.[31]

 

Administrative waivers of the Jones Act are not necessarily a modern invention. In the days immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed an executive order establishing two ways in which the Secretary of Commerce could “waive compliance with the navigation and vessel inspection laws.” First, the waiver could be issued “upon the request of the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War to the extent deemed necessary in the conduct of the war by the officer making the request.” Second, the Secretary of Commerce could waive such laws “to such extent and in such manner and upon such terms as he may prescribe, either upon his own initiative or upon the written recommendation of the head of any other Government agency that such action is necessary in the conduct of the war.”[32]

 

In the early weeks after the U.S. entered World War II, President Roosevelt issued another executive order that redistributed certain maritime-related functions from the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, then housed within the Department of Commerce, to other federal agencies. Functions related to vessel documentation and finance were transferred to the Bureau of Customs, then housed within the Department of the Treasury. Functions related to vessel safety, inspection, and merchant seamen were transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard, then under the Department of the Navy in wartime. The Secretary of Commerce’s prior authority to waive the navigation and inspection laws was transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively.[33]

 

Later that month in March 1942, Congress passed the Second War Powers Act, which statutorily granted each department or agency head “responsible for the administration of the navigation and vessel inspection laws . . . to waive compliance with such laws upon the request of the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War to the extent deemed necessary in the conduct of the war by the officer making the request.”[34] While the law was amended in certain ways after World War II, these wartime developments established the early framework for the modern-day Jones Act administrative waiver regime.

 

Today, administrative waivers may be issued under two authorities: section 501(a) or section 501(b) of Title 46, Subtitle I, Chapter 5 of the U.S. Code.[35]

 

Under section 501(a), the authority relied upon for the March 17, 2026, administrative waiver, the Secretary of Homeland Security must grant a Jones Act waiver request from the Secretary of War when the waiver is required “to address an immediate adverse effect on military operations.” Notably, section 501(a) waivers do not require a determination as to whether U.S.-flagged vessels are available.[36] However, under section 501(a), the Secretary of War must provide to Congress “a written explanation of the circumstances requiring such a waiver . . . including a confirmation that there are insufficient qualified vessels to meet the needs of national defense without such a waiver.”[37]

 

Under section 501(b), the President must determine that a waiver “is necessary in the interest of national defense.”[38] The Maritime Administrator must then determine “the non-availability of qualified [U.S.] flag capacity to meet national defense requirements,”[39] and must publish such determinations on its website, a requirement added in 2012.[40] This requires “identify[ing] any actions that could be taken to enable qualified [U.S.] flag capacity to meet national defense requirements prior to the issuance of a waiver.”[41]

 

MARAD is prohibited from “assess[ing] the non-availability of qualified [U.S.] flag capacity to meet national defense requirements retrospectively after the date on which a waiver is requested.”[42] CBP is required to publish the waiver notice on its website for at least forty-eight hours before the waiver takes effect, in theory allowing Jones Act-qualified vessels an opportunity to offer capacity.[43] Under section 501(b), waivers are on a “vessel specific basis”[44] and are limited to “a period of not more than [ten] days.”[45]

 

Jones Act administrative waivers have been issued with some degree of regularity in recent years. In 2005, short-term waivers were issued for the transportation of “petroleum and refined petroleum products” in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina[46] and later Hurricane Rita.[47] In 2011, following the release of thirty million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve tied to the conflict in Libya, the Obama Administration issued over forty Jones Act waivers to transport crude.[48] In 2012, a waiver was issued in response to Hurricane Sandy.[49]

 

In 2017, when contemplating a waiver following Hurricane Maria, which impacted the island of Puerto Rico, President Trump expressed reluctance to waive the Jones Act.[50] However, waivers were issued during the historic 2017 Atlantic hurricane season.[51] In 2021, waivers were issued following the Colonial Pipeline cyberattack.[52]

 

Most recently, in the context of Hurricane Fiona in 2022, a request for MARAD to retroactively conduct a U.S. vessel availability survey exposed the potential to circumvent the spirit of the waiver framework. In that instance, before a waiver request had been submitted, a foreign-flagged tanker had already departed Texas City, Texas, carrying approximately 300,000 barrels of diesel, and was already underway to Guayanilla, Puerto Rico. The Maritime Administrator called this a “novel and problematic” waiver request.[53]

 

Previously, under section 501(b), the Secretary of Homeland Security could determine the necessity of a waiver without the President’s determination, but this was amended through the enactment of the 2023 NDAA.[54]

 

III. An Unsuccessful Constitutional Challenge

 

Especially in light of the March 17, 2026, waiver issued under section 501(a), a decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, issued on January 20, 2026, underscores the Jones Act’s significance to U.S. interests.[55]

 

On February 25, 2025, Kōloa Rum Company, a small-batch rum distillery located on the Hawaiian island of Kauai, filed a complaint against the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Acting CBP Commissioner. The complaint alleged that the Jones Act violates the Port Preference Clause of the Constitution because it “unlawfully discriminates against the ports of Hawaii.”[56]

 

The next month, the rum company filed an amended complaint, asserting a second cause of action that the Jones Act “deprives Kōloa Rum Company of its right to earn a living without due process of law.”[57] The Port Preference Clause argument was seemingly inspired by a Yale Law Journal article[58] cited in the rum company’s complaint and amended complaint.[59]

 

The court granted motions to intervene[60] by defendant-intervenors Matson Navigation Company, Inc.,[61] “the leading Jones Act carrier for coastwise trade with Hawaii,”[62] along with the American Maritime Partnership (AMP) and the Maritime Trades Department of the AFL-CIO (MTD),[63] “two national associations representing hundreds of companies and unions comprising the American maritime industry.”[64] The Government moved to dismiss the lawsuit, citing Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent to support its position that “the Jones Act comes nowhere close to violating either Constitutional provision” alleged by the company.[65]

 

[66]

 

Similarly, Matson cited past unsuccessful challenges of the Jones Act made on constitutional grounds,[67] including under the Port Preference Clause,[68] the Due Process Clause,[69] and the Commerce Clause.[70] Among other compelling arguments, AMP and MTD recounted that, “[t]he fundamental objectives of the nation’s cabotage laws, and the means of achieving those objectives by reserving transportation of merchandise between U.S. points to U.S. vessels, have remained largely constant for over 200 years.”[71]

 

Before reaching the merits, Chief Judge Boasberg concluded that the company had standing to sue, while acknowledging the suit “present[ed] difficult standing questions.”[72] First, to satisfy the injury requirement, the court noted that while the company’s alleged injury may have been shared by other Hawaii businesses, it was “nevertheless a specific pecuniary harm rather than a ‘general legal, moral, ideological, or policy objection to a particular government action.’”[73]

 

Second, to show causation, the court noted the question of “traceability [was] less easily resolved.”[74] Despite the basic geographic reality that the rum company is located over 2,000 miles from the U.S. mainland, which would likely explain the company’s allegedly higher costs compared to mainland distilleries,[75] the court found that the causation prong was satisfied in this case.[76]

 

Lastly, the court held that the redressability requirement was satisfied because the plaintiffs sought “a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from enforcing [Jones Act] provisions against Kōloa Rum Company as applied to interstate trade with Hawaii.”[77] With that said, Chief Judge Boasberg quickly noted that even though the company had standing, this was “as evanescent as the breeze in the face of additional grounds for dismissal.”[78]

 

Next, before addressing the company’s two constitutional claims, the court considered whether the company’s challenge was time-barred[79] under the default six-year statute of limitations for actions against the federal government.[80] Even under the Court’s recent decision in Corner Post, which clarified that a plaintiff’s statute of limitations period for suits under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) “first accrues” once a rule injures the plaintiff, not once the rule is first promulgated, the claim “ha[d] already sailed” in 2015.[81]

 

Chief Judge Boasberg noted, “1920 is not the year in which the clock start[ed] on Kōloa Rum’s alleged injury, [and] Intervenors are correct that the company’s injury ‘first accrued’ in 2009.”[82] Since the company was established in 2009, it had until 2015 to file a timely claim under the statute of limitations.[83] This deadline expired ten years before the rum company ultimately filed its lawsuit in 2025.

 

Lastly, the court addressed the merits of the rum company’s unsuccessful constitutional claims. First, the court addressed the company’s claim under the Port Preference Clause.[84] This was considered by addressing two issues: (a) “whether the Port Preference Clause extends beyond direct discrimination to reach facially neutral statutes” and (b) “if so, whether Plaintiff ha[d] plausibly alleged that Congress enacted the Jones Act to discriminate against Hawaiian ports.”[85]

 

The court explained that the Clause was a product of the 1787 Constitutional Convention held in Philadelphia. Maryland’s delegates to the Convention were concerned about “compel[ling] ships sailing in or out of the Chesapeake to clear or enter at Norfolk, or some port in Virginia—a regulation that would be injurious to the commerce of Maryland.”[86]

 

Chief Judge Boasberg added that courts have narrowly interpreted the Port Preference Clause’s framework, including the D.C. Circuit.[87] For example, in comparing it to the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution,[88] the D.C. Circuit concluded that both clauses “have been narrowly construed to prohibit certain forms of direct discrimination between States within the legislative spheres to which the provisions apply.”[89]

 

In applying the Port Preference Clause to the Jones Act, Chief Judge Boasberg could not have been clearer: “the Jones Act is neutral legislation that does not create any direct preferences by channeling commerce through the ports of one state at the expense of others.”[90] In addressing the claim that the Jones Act was perhaps “a scheme to disadvantage Hawaii,” the court thoroughly recounted the long history of U.S. cabotage laws.[91] Once again, the court looked to the D.C. Circuit’s historical account that, “[f]rom our First Congress in 1789, American shipping in the [U.S.] coastwise maritime trade has been protected from foreign competition.”[92]

 

Second, the court addressed the rum company’s claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[93] The company claimed its “ability to share its unique, award-winning spirits . . . is crippled by [the Jones Act].”[94] The court was not convinced. Chief Judge Boasberg explained that “the Jones Act does not deprive Plaintiff of a right to pursue an occupation. The Act regulates domestic shipping; it does not bar Kōloa Rum from distilling and selling rum.”[95]

 

Chief Judge Boasberg added that the rum company failed to show “that the Jones Act subjects it to any constitutionally cognizable burden.”[96] In applying the rational basis test, the court was decisive in its assessment that the company failed to show evidence of its claim that Congress lacked a “legitimate state interest” when it enacted the Jones Act.[97] In fact, the court noted that the Jones Act exceeded the rational basis test “with room to spare.”[98]

 

IV. Conclusion

 

As of the date of this blog post, as the U.S. coastwise trade remains available to foreign vessels, there is no evidence that the March 17 waiver of the Jones Act has led to any material benefits to consumers, such as lower U.S. gasoline prices attributable to the waiver. Especially in light of recent events, including the March 17 waiver, Kōloa Rum Co. serves as an important, recent judicial reaffirmation of the Jones Act. According to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the Jones Act’s stated purposes of “maintaining a strong domestic merchant marine, protecting national security by ensuring that vessels are available for military use, and supporting American maritime employment” are certainly to be considered “paradigmatic examples of legitimate governmental interests.”[99]

 

[1] See Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, § 27, 41 Stat. 988 (June 5, 1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 55101–55123).

 

[2] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (12th ed. 2024).

 

[3] Prior to its enactment, the legislation was often called the “Jones Bill.” See, e.g., Seven to Act on Jones Bill, SEATTLE STAR, May 29, 1920, at 1.

 

[4] See 5 Rich. II, stat. 1, c. 3 (1381).

 

[5] See generally SEAFARERS' RIGHTS INT’L, CABOTAGE LAWS OF THE WORLD (2025), https://seafarersrights.org/seafarers-subjects/cabotage.

 

[6] See 19 C.F.R. 122.165(a) (2026).

 

[7] See 19 C.F.R. § 123.14(c) (2026).

 

[8] See 46 U.S.C. § 12112; 46 C.F.R. § 67.19 (2026).

 

[9] For example, CBP issues ruling letters to parties seeking guidance before a transportation of merchandise occurs, namely whether a prospective transportation would violate the U.S. coastwise laws. These ruling letters apply to the facts provided by the requesting party and other parties with identical circumstances. See generally 19 C.F.R. § 177.1–.13 (2026).

 

[10] Vessels in Foreign and Domestic Trades; Coastwise Transportation of Merchandise, 44 Fed. Reg. 42176, 42178 (July 19, 1979).

 

[11] 19 U.S.C. § 1401(c). Merchandise also includes U.S. government or state-owned merchandise and valueless material. See 46 U.S.C § 55102(a).

 

[12] See 46 U.S.C. § 12102(a); 46 C.F.R. § 67.7 (2026).

 

[13] See 46 U.S.C. § 12112(a)(2)(A); 46 C.F.R. § 67.97 (2026).

 

[14] See 46 U.S.C §§ 12103(a)(1), 55102(b)(1); 46 C.F.R. §§ 67.30–.43 (2026).

 

[15] See generally 46 U.S.C. § 8103.

 

[16] See, e.g., Passenger Vessel Services Act (PVSA), ch. 421, § 8, 24 Stat. 79, 81 (June 19, 1886) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 55103); Foreign Dredge Act of 1906, ch. 2566, 34 Stat. 204 (May 28, 1906) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 55109); Towing Statute, ch. 324, 54 Stat. 304 (June 11, 1940) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 55111, 55118).

 

[17] See Jennifer Mascott, Early Customs Laws and Delegation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1388, 1393 (2019).

 

[18] See An Act imposing Duties on Tonnage, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27, 27-28 (July 20, 1789).

 

[19] See Navigation Act of 1817, ch. 31, § 4, 3 Stat. 351 (Mar. 1, 1817).

 

[20] See Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, § 27, 41 Stat. 988 (June 5, 1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 55101–55123).

 

[21] See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CSMS # 68096516 - Implementation of Jones Act Waiver Issued to the Department of War, dated March 17, 2026 (Mar. 19, 2026),

https://content.govdelivery.com/bulletins/gd/USDHSCBP-40f1204?wgt_ref=USDHSCBP_WIDGET_2.

 

[22] See Press Release, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Forces Launch Operation Epic Fury (Feb. 28, 2026), https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4418396/us-forces-launch-operation-epic-fury.

 

[23] See, e.g., U.S. MAR. ADMIN., Maritime Advisory 2026-004-Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman-Iranian Attacks on Commercial Vessels (Mar. 13, 2026), https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-004-persian-gulf-strait-hormuz-and-gulf-oman-iranian-attacks-commercial-vessels.

 

[24] For example, approximately twenty percent of the world’s oil supply flows through the Strait of Hormuz. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., Short-Term Energy Outlook (Mar. 10, 2026), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf.

 

[25] Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554, 2026 WL 145882, *17 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2026).

 

[26] For example, in 2011, Congress made certain vessels eligible for exemption by MARAD ahead of the 34th America’s Cup because the sailing yacht competition occurred within the territorial sea limits of the U.S. See America’s Cup Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-61, 125 Stat. 753 (2011).

 

[27] See CSMS # 68096516.

 

[28] See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CSMS # 68180454 - Updated Guidance: Implementation of Jones Act Waiver issued to the Department of War, dated March 17, 2026 (Mar. 27, 2026), https://content.govdelivery.com/bulletins/gd/USDHSCBP-41059e6?wgt_ref=USDHSCBP_WIDGET_2.

 

[29] Karoline Leavitt (@PressSec), X (formerly Twitter), (Mar. 18, 2026, 9:54 AM), https://x.com/PressSec/status/2034267144477614178.

 

[30] See 46 U.S.C. § 501(c).

 

[31] See 20260410 1300 MARAD 501c WAIVER REPORT (Apr. 10, 2026), https://www.maritime.dot.gov/ports/domestic-shipping/20260410-1300-marad-501c-waiver-report; U.S. MAR. ADMIN., 20260409 1200 MARAD 501C WAIVER REPORT (Apr. 9, 2026), https://www.maritime.dot.gov/ports/domestic-shipping/20260409-1200-marad-501c-waiver-report; 20260408 0900 MARAD 501C WAIVER REPORT (Apr. 8, 2026), https://www.maritime.dot.gov/ports/domestic-shipping/20260408-0900-marad-501c-waiver-report.

 

[32] See Authorizing the Secretary of Commerce To Waive Compliance With the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Laws for War Purposes, Exec. Order No. 8976, 6 Fed. Reg. 6441-42 (Dec. 17, 1941).

 

[33] See Redistribution of Maritime Functions, Exec. Order No. 9083, 7 Fed. Reg. 1609-10 (Mar. 3, 1942).

 

[34] Second War Powers Act § 635, Pub. L. No. 77-507, 56 Stat. 176 (Mar. 27, 1942).

 

[35] See 46 U.S.C. §§ 501(a)-(b).

 

[36] See 46 U.S.C. § 501(a)(1).

 

[37] This information must be submitted to the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Commerce Committee, and the Senate Armed Services Committee. See 46 U.S.C. § 501(a)(2).

 

[38] See 46 U.S.C. § 501(b)(1).

 

[39] See 46 U.S.C. § 501(b)(1)(A).

 

[40] See Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012 § 301, Pub. L. No. 112-213, 126 Stat. 1562 (Dec. 20, 2012).

 

[41] See 46 U.S.C. § 501(b)(3)(A)(i).

 

[42] See 46 U.S.C. § 501(b)(3)(A)(ii).

 

[43] See 46 U.S.C. § 501(b)(6)(A).

 

[44] See 46 U.S.C. § 501(b)(1)(C).

 

[45] See 46 U.S.C. § 501(b)(2)(A). Waivers may be extended for an additional period of ten days. See 46 U.S.C. § 501(b)(2)(B). However, they may not exceed forty-five days in the aggregate. See 46 U.S.C. § 501(b)(2)(C).

 

[46] See Waiver of Compliance With Navigation and Inspection Laws, 70 Fed. Reg. 53236 (Sep. 7, 2005) (Hurricane Katrina).

 

[47] See Waiver of Compliance With Navigation and Inspection Laws; Gulf Coast States, 70 Fed. Reg. 57611 (Oct. 3, 2005) (Hurricane Rita).

 

[48] See John Broder, Oil Reserves Sidestep U.S. Vessels, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/business/oil-reserves-sidestep-us-vessels.html.

 

[49] See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces Expansion of Temporary, Blanket Jones Act Waiver (Nov. 3, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/archive/news/2012/11/03/dhs-announces-expansion-temporary-blanket-jones-act-waiver.

 

[50] See Natalie Andrews & Paul Page, Trump Weighs Waiving Law Barring Foreign Ships From Delivering Aid to Puerto Rico, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 27, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-seek-waiver-of-law-barring-foreign-ships-from-delivering-aid-to-puerto-rico-1506529999.

 

[51] See Waiver of Compliance With Navigation Laws, 82 Fed. Reg. 43782 (Sep. 19, 2017) (Hurricanes Harvey and Irma); Waiver of Compliance With Navigation Laws, 82 Fed. Reg. 46254 (Oct. 4, 2017) (Hurricane Maria).

 

[52] See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Mayorkas on the Approval of a Jones Act Waiver in Response to Eastern Seaboard Oil Supply Constraints (May 12, 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/archive/news/2021/05/12/statement-secretary-mayorkas-approval-jones-act-waiver-response-eastern-seaboard.

 

[53] See Vessel Availability Determination Letter, U.S. Mar. Admin. (Sep. 28, 2022), https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/ marad.dot.gov/files/2022-09/Determination%2028%20September%202022.pdf.

 

[54] See James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, 136 Stat. 2395 (Dec. 23, 2022).

 

[55] Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554, 2026 WL 145882, (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2026).

 

[56] Complaint, Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554, (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2025), ECF No. 1 at 3.

 

[57] Amended Complaint, Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554, (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2025), ECF No. 13 at 14.

 

[58] See generally Sam Heavenrich, The Neglected Port Preference Clause and the Jones Act, 132 YALE L.J. 559 (2022).

 

[59] ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 13 at 5.

 

[60] Order, Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554, (D.D.C. June 30, 2025), ECF No. 36 at 4-5.

 

[61] See generally Motion to Intervene by Matson Navigation Co., Inc., Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554, (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2025), ECF No. 15.

 

[62] Kōloa Rum Co., 2026 WL 145882, at *3.

 

[63] See generally Motion to Intervene by the American Maritime Partnership and the Maritime Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, Inc., Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554, (D.D.C. May 22, 2025), ECF No. 31.

 

[64] Kōloa Rum Co., 2026 WL 145882, at *3.

 

[65] Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554, (D.D.C. July 30, 2025), ECF No. 43 at 1.

[66] Pictured is the Daniel K. Inouye, a Jones Act-qualified containership and the largest ever built in the U.S. See Press Release, Matson Navigation Co., Inc., Matson Vessel ‘Daniel K. Inouye’ Arrives In Honolulu (Nov. 28, 2018), https://investor.matson.com/news-releases/news-release-details/matson-vessel-daniel-k-inouye-arrives-honolulu.

 

[67] Motion to Dismiss by Matson Navigation Co., Inc., Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554, (D.D.C. July 30, 2025), ECF No. 42 at 8-9.

 

[68] See id. (citing Territory of Alaska v. Troy, 258 U.S. 101, 111 (1922)).

 

[69] See id. (citing Cent. Vermont Transp. Co. v. Durning, 294 U.S. 33, 40 (1935)).

 

[70] See id. (citing Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1020-22 (9th Cir. 2015); Kauai Kunana Dairy Inc. v. United States, 2009 WL 4668744, at *6 (D. Haw. Dec. 8, 2009)).

 

[71] Motion to Dismiss by American Maritime Partnership and the Maritime Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, Inc., Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554, (D.D.C. July 31, 2025), ECF No. 44 at 5.

 

[72] Kōloa Rum Co., 2026 WL 145882, at *9.

 

[73] Id. at *5 (citing All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024)).

 

[74] Id.

 

[75] For example, the rum company’s choice “to locate its business on the small island of Kauai, with a population of fewer than 75,000 and only small port facilities.” ECF No. 42 at 11.

 

[76] Kōloa Rum Co., 2026 WL 145882, at *7.

                                   

[77] Id. at *9 (citing ECF No. 13 at 15).

 

[78] Id.

 

[79] Id.

 

[80] “[E]very civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.”  28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).

 

[81] Kōloa Rum Co., 2026 WL 145882, at *10-11 (citing Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 809 (2024)).

 

[82] Id. at *10 (citing Intervenor-Defendants American Maritime Partners and the Maritime Trades Department of the AFL-CIO’s Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Kōloa Rum Company’s First Amended Complaint, Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554, (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2025), ECF No. 50.

 

[83] Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)).

 

[84] “No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.

 

[85] Kōloa Rum Co., 2026 WL 145882, at *12.

 

[86] Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 434 (1855)).

 

[87] See id. at *13.

 

[88] “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

 

[89] Kōloa Rum Co., 2026 WL 145882, at *13 (citing Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).

 

[90] Id. at *14.

 

[91] Id. at *15.

 

[92] Id. (citing Am. Mar. Ass’n v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).

 

[93] “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.

 

[94] Kōloa Rum Co., 2026 WL 145882, at *15 (citing ECF No. 13 at 2).

 

[95] Id. at *17.

 

[96] Id. at *18.

 

[97] Id. at *20.

 

[98] Id.

 

[99] Id.