The first post in this series introduced the Denver Urban Renewal Authority's newly initiated blight conditions study for the area surrounding the Broncos' planned Burnham Yard stadium development. It identified a structural concern: Colorado's blight definition allows conditions on public rights-of-way to satisfy statutory factors that can then justify condemning neighboring private property.[1] This post examines that problem in closer statutory detail, tracing how each relevant blight factor interacts with public infrastructure conditions and identifying the doctrinal gap that leaves the question unresolved.
Colorado's Urban Renewal Law requires the presence of at least four of eleven factors to support a blight designation, or five factors where the resulting eminent domain would transfer condemned property to a private party.[2]The statutes do not distinguish between conditions on public land and conditions on private land.[3] It does not ask who is responsible for the condition.[4] And it does not require that any blight factor be found on the specific parcel targeted for acquisition.[5] These are not oversights; these are features of an area-wide assessment framework that evaluates neighborhoods holistically rather than parcel-by-parcel.[6] But that framework creates a problem when the area under study includes public rights-of-way alongside private parcels since the government effectively controls one side of the ledger.[7]
Consider the factors individually. Factor (b) targets the "predominance of defective or inadequate street layout."[8]The phrase "other improvements" is not limited to private structures.[9] Sidewalks, curbs, gutters, medians, retaining walls, and drainage ditches located in the public ROW are all "improvements" in the ordinary meaning of the term.[10] In practice, blight studies routinely document cracked sidewalks, crumbling curbs, and deteriorating pavement as evidence of this factor—conditions that exist on public land which are the responsibility of the City.[11]
Factor (f) is even more explicit: it captures "unusual topography or inadequate public improvements or utilities."[12] Government-owned and government-maintained systems include aging water mains, undersized stormwater systems, and deteriorating sewer lines.[13] Their inadequacy reflects the municipality's own investment decisions. The Tenth Circuit touched on this dynamic in M.A.K. Investment Group v. City of Glendale, where commentary on the underlying blight study observed that factors like overhead utilities, water and sewer service, and stormwater quality were conditions the affected property owner had no control over.[14]
Factor (e) covers "deterioration of site or other improvements."[15] The phrase "other improvements" is not limited to private structures.[16] Sidewalks, curbs, gutters, medians, retaining walls, and drainage ditches located in the public ROW are all "improvements" in the ordinary meaning of the term.[17]
Factors (d) and (h) are broader. Factor (d) addresses "unsanitary or unsafe conditions"; factor (h) covers "conditions that endanger life or property by fire or other causes."[18] Both are capacious enough to capture hazards arising from public infrastructure: a missing crosswalk signal, an unlit stretch of road, a drainage channel prone to flooding, a sidewalk gap forcing pedestrians into traffic.[19]
That gives us five factors— (b), (d), (e), (f), and (h)— that can be satisfied primarily or entirely by conditions on government-controlled infrastructure.[20] The four-factor threshold for a standard blight designation, and even the five-factor threshold for private-party condemnation, can theoretically be met without any blight being present on the private parcels within the study area.
Two statutory provisions compound the problem. The first is the double-counting rule. Section 31-25-107(1)(c)(I) provides that "any particular condition found to be present may satisfy as many of the factors referenced in section 31-25-103(2) as are applicable to such condition."[21] A single deteriorating road could simultaneously satisfy factor (b) (defective street layout), factor (d) (unsafe conditions), factor (e) (deterioration of improvements), and factor (h) (conditions endangering life or property).
The second is the absence of a prevalence requirement. The statute does not require that blight factors be found on any minimum percentage of parcels in the study area.[22] A study area could contain fifty parcels, forty-nine of them well-maintained and fully occupied, and still be designated blighted if four factors are present somewhere within its boundaries. This is where the area-wide assessment model, combined with the inclusion of public ROW in the study area, becomes particularly powerful. ROW conditions are, by their nature, distributed throughout any study area that includes streets.
No published Colorado appellate decision squarely addresses whether conditions on public rights-of-way can be used to inflate a blight finding for the purpose of condemning private property. This is a significant gap in the case law. The Colorado Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of the Urban Renewal Law,[23] the standard of judicial review for blight determinations,[24] and the availability of pretextual-takings challenges.[25] But no court has been asked to rule on the specific question of whether blight factors satisfied by government-controlled infrastructure conditions provide a legally sufficient basis for condemning private parcels that are not themselves blighted.
The gap matters because the existing case law provides limited tools for addressing the problem. Blight determinations are legislative findings reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, not de novo.[26] A property owner challenging a designation must show that the governing body exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, which is a high bar when the statute's text facially permits exactly the methodology at issue.[27] The pretextual-takings doctrine from Block 173 Associates allows courts to look behind a procedurally valid blight finding to examine whether the actual purpose was blight eradication or private acquisition.[28] But that doctrine addresses motive, not method.[29] A municipality could act in perfect good faith and still produce a designation that rests primarily on conditions the municipality itself created and controls.
This is the analytical core of the ROW inflation problem. It is not simply a question of whether DURA or the Broncos are acting in bad faith. It is a question of whether the statute's structure permits an outcome in which the government's failure to maintain its own infrastructure becomes the legal basis for taking private property. The government entity responsible for roads, sidewalks, and utilities is the same entity empowered to cite their deterioration as evidence of blight. The fox (the city) is not merely guarding the henhouse; it is defining what constitutes a hen (property owners).
[1]See Cameron Westbrook, Blight, Rights (of Way), and the Broncos: Can Denver Consider Road Conditions in Blight Studies? TRANSP. L.J. (Apr. 20, 2026).
[9]See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-25-103(2)(e) (2024) (referencing "deterioration of site or other improvements" without limiting "improvements" to privately owned structures).
[10]See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-15-702(b)(I)–(II) (2024) (municipalities authorized to construct and maintain sidewalks, curbs, gutters, and street improvements); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-20-603(9) (2025) (defining "improvements" to include sidewalks, curbs, gutters, grading, culverts, sewers, and drains in the public ROW context).
[11]See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-15-702(b)(I)–(II) (granting municipalities authority and responsibility for construction and maintenance of sidewalks, curbs, gutters, and street improvements).
[17]SeeColo. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-15-702(b)(I)–(II) (granting municipalities authority and responsibility for construction and maintenance of sidewalks, curbs, gutters, and street improvements).
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